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Why is Liberal Peacebuilding so Difficult?  
Some Lessons from Central America 
Sabine Kurtenbach 
Abstract: According to the liberal peacebuilding paradigm the termination of war is a window of opportu-
nity for fundamental change. Central America has been one of the first laboratories of international policies 
promoting the threefold transformation process of pacification, democratization and economic liberaliza-
tion. Although none of the post-war countries (Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala) slipped back into war, 
serious deficits abound that can neither be explained as mere consequences of war nor as ‘normal’ devel-
opmental problems. The paper introduces an analytical framework locating these problems at the intersec-
tion between external influences, societal foundations, consequences of war and violence as well as peace-
building. The comparative analysis of the three transformation processes – democratization, market econ-
omy and pacification – shows how path dependent patterns remain dominant while reform processes are 
fragile. This allows for an explanation of common features as well as differences inside the region.  
Keywords: peacebuilding, transformation, path-dependency, Central America. 
 
More than twenty-two years ago on 7 August 1987, the Central American presi-
dents signed a comprehensive peace treaty (Esquipulas-II), which was a first step 
to end the internal wars in Nicaragua (1990), El Salvador (1992) and Guatemala 
(1996).1 War and violence had taken over 300,000 lives, caused the displacement 
of two million Central Americans from their homes and destroyed a significant 
portion of the already weak social and economic infrastructure. The formal ending 
of the wars was seen as a basis not just for recovery but for a fundamental trans-
formation of the region towards peace, stability and development. From a global 
perspective, Central America was one of the first laboratories for the liberal peace-
building paradigm, a label attached to the increasingly comprehensive external 
interventions in post-war and post-conflict societies.2 This paradigm assumes that 
the threefold transformation to peace, democracy and market economy is a self-
strengthening process leading to sustainable development (see Paris 2004).  
 In the meantime the problems of implementation have become obvious in many 
post-war countries, with Afghanistan being the most recent example. At least at a 
first glance Central America remains one of the few successful cases as none of the 
three countries has slipped back into war. Nevertheless serious deficits in the trans-
formation processes are obvious: democratization is fragile, development patterns 
are unequal and the levels of violence high. These problems can be analysed as 
symptoms for the difficult interaction between historically ingrained development 
paths, the legacy of war and violence and the liberal peacebuilding agenda.  
A contextual framework for the analysis of post-war societies 
The liberal paradigm in international politics promotes a threefold transformation 
process of democratization, economic liberalization, and pacification as the foun-
dation for peacebuilding. The underlying assumption is that the transformation 
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processes will cause positive feedbacks on each other. The theoretical framework 
is rooted in the historical experiences of Western Europe and the body of socio-
logical, political and economic research developed in this context.3 While this ap-
proach was relatively successful in Europe and Japan after World War II, today it 
has fallen short for two reasons. First, the international context has changed dra-
matically from a state-centred system to a globalized system resulting in a series of 
fractures for the post-war societies. Second, peacebuilding strategies systematically 
underestimate the influence of local or national development features as well as the 
competing dynamics favouring violence or peace in post-war societies. Hence the 
reality of today’s post-war countries is quite different from historical examples, 
showing a wide range from a direct backslide into war or armed conflict to the devel-
opment of hybrid regimes that use formal democracy as a façade or renew traditional 
patterns of ‘mal-development’ and violence. The main body of the existing literature 
analyses these processes from the perspective of external actors (mandate, dura-
tion, funding), in specific sectors (elections, aid, reconstruction) or in the form of 
case studies. Comparative and integrated approaches are nearly non-existent. 4  
 The contextual framework developed here aims to open a new perspective for 
the comparative analysis of post-war societies from different historical, cultural 
and regional areas. Its starting point is the fact that conflict is inherent to processes 
of social change and development. Both processes lead to fundamental changes of 
the structures of society and provoke realignments of the relations and the power 
distribution between central actors. In the twenty-first century these processes are 
influenced by the growing interdependence and the various influences the interna-
tional system and the multitude of actors have all over the world. International 
norms and treaties, global economic trends, etc. have a growing impact that goes 
far beyond the actions of peacebuilding missions or international aid agencies. At 
the same time, the degree and level of their influence is not unidirectional but de-
pends on the historical, cultural and social structure of a given society. From this 
perspective, the main focus of analysis of post-war societies should be the double 
intersection between the external requirements (supporting or blocking transforma-
tion) and the societal basis (enabling or hindering transformation) on the one hand, 
and the changes in society caused by the war and the details of the process of its 
termination on the other. Peacebuilding is thus understood as an intermestic issue 
that must be analysed as the outcome of the complex relationship between these 
four variables. While the interaction between the process of globalization and the 
historical and cultural foundations of a society is most relevant at the level of struc-
tures (institutions, models of development, among others), the intersection between 
war and peace is highly relevant for the behaviour of the central actors (e.g. per-
ceptions, options for action, strategies, alliances). The framework thus enables us to 
integrate the analysis of structures and actors in the process of change. This is a chal-
lenging as well as an innovative endeavour; nonetheless it is necessary to handle the 
growing complexity that comparative research has to address (see Schmitter 2009). 
 Compared to other approaches to post-war societies, this research perspective 
has the advantage of opening up the analysis beyond the direct actors and conse-
quences of war and put society at the centre. This is important as success and fail-
ure of the larger process of peacebuilding can only be understood and explained 
when we look at and analyse the interplay between society, war and transformation 
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process. Here the former war actors are important but not necessarily the most de-
cisive players. This ‘societal perspective’ enables us to analyse long-term proc-
esses beyond current developments and events by placing them in perspective. The 
analysis therefore needs to follow a double tracked approach looking at longitudi-
nal developments and at fractures caused either by war and violence or by the re-
quirements of the transformation process. 
 Methodologically this concept relies on studies of path dependency that empha-
size the importance of time and process.5 In our context the liberal peace hypothe-
sis assumes that war termination can be a ‘critical juncture’ for pacification, de-
mocratization and development. The crucial question is then whether – and under 
what conditions – peacebuilding can activate key variables in favour of the self-
reinforcing process, and under which circumstances it triggers factors causing 
blockades, turns into hybrid forms or even setbacks. So what are the key variables 
for the threefold transformation process and how are they shaped by the double 
intersection? 
Democratization 
The authoritarian and exclusionary nature of the political regime has been an im-
portant cause of the Central American wars (and elsewhere). Hence regime change 
and democratization after the war’s end are seen both as a mechanism to address 
structural causes of war as well as a tool for the prevention of renewed violence. 
The underlying assumption of modernization and civilization theory (Elias 1976, 
among others) is that social change (differentiation, urbanization, education, etc.) 
leads to the extension of internal and external controls for interpersonal violence, 
thus establishing a positive relationship between social change, democracy and 
violence control.6 As a result democratization of the political system has become 
the central demand of the various external actors in post-war countries. The third 
wave of democratization and the end of the cold war seemed to make democratiza-
tion possible all over the world. But while the transition to electoral democracy is 
quite simple (although the standards of free, fair and universal elections are not met 
everywhere), the consolidation and persistence of democratic regimes are related to 
the substance and quality of the regime change.7 
 Democratization is a very complex and conflictive process because it restruc-
tures the traditional power system. Even under a limited polyarchy concept of de-
mocracy, democratization in post-war contexts is a highly conflictive process for 
ex-combatants as well as for society overall (see Mansfield and Snyder 1995). 
Macro quantitative studies on the correlation between political regimes and vio-
lence find evidence for the democratic peace/civilization theory approach but also 
for high levels of conflict and violence during democratization. Hegre (2004) de-
scribes the development as an inverted U, where violence is less likely either in 
stable authoritarian regimes or in consolidated democracies, while it first increases 
and then decreases in the transformation process from one into the other. As most 
post-war countries are at the beginning of this process, they are rather unlikely 
candidates for successful transition and consolidation to democracy. 
 Focussing on the double intersection, democratization is influenced by external 
demands for – at least formal – democratization, by the existence or absence of an 
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internal, societal foundation as well as the power relations between different actors 
shaped by war and its termination. Under this perspective two issues are of major 
importance for post-war democratization:  
o The existence of a societal basis: the transformation theory formulates a series 
of conditions that are important for the transition and the consolidation of de-
mocracy like a majority of actors favouring democracy, a lack of viable alterna-
tives and historic experiences or traditions of democratic participation (see 
Merkel 1999, Merkel and Puhle 1999). Tilly’s (2007) concept of democratiza-
tion and de-democratization is a useful tool to identify some factors that might 
also be important for post-war contexts. He distinguishes three clusters of proc-
esses, each of which can show an increasing or decreasing tendency (pp. 23-
24): integration between interpersonal networks of trust and public policies; in-
sulation of public policies from existing forms of inequality influencing every-
day life (ethnicity, gender, etc); autonomy of major power centres (with most of 
all those commanding means of coercion like warlords, clientele networks, ar-
mies, religious communities) from public policies. These processes are highly 
related to the broader changes that war and violence have on the structure and 
the different actors of society. 
o Effects and consequences of war and violence: war and widespread violence 
influence the character of a political regime or may even lead to a change or 
transformation of existing regimes. This happens either through processes of 
militarization and the strengthening of vertical hierarchies due to real or sup-
posed necessities of the ‘war effort’ or through a rupture of the existing regime. 
Being at war, even liberal democracies limit existing civil rights and liberties. 
Post-war societies thus face the challenge of liberalization and inclusion of 
marginalized sectors and the mitigation of polarized environments. The trans-
formation of armed actors into political actors is just one important issue for 
successful democratization. Equally eminent under a broader perspective is that 
institutional arrangements are open for the inclusion of other political forces 
and the change in power relationships and help the various parts of society to 
overcome fear and develop civic trust.8 
Thus most post-war situations are characterized by hybrid regimes and by the con-
flict between actors in favour of or against transformation. They mostly still rely on 
their war-time constituencies but need to renew and to adjust their social base to 
the new context. 
Central American democracy 
Developments in Central America illustrate the related problems. Democratization 
began in the midst of war in all three countries as a result of international – mostly 
US – pressure. The societal basis for this process was historically small and highly 
shaped by violence.9 Although external pressure led to an opening of the former 
authoritarian systems and to an expansion of options for the non-armed opposition, 
it also implied a series of restrictions as a consequence of war and violence: 
o authoritarian enclaves were institutionalized; 
o the military remained in charge of internal ‘security’; and 
o participation remained restricted as long as the wars were ongoing. 
European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 88, April 2010  |  99 
 
Only in Nicaragua was the end of war the result of a lost election of the Sandinista 
regime, while in El Salvador and Guatemala the comprehensive peace accords 
were the basis for general elections with the participation of all political forces. 
 The various peace treaties all contained regulations on the consolidation and 
deepening of democracy and the civilian control over the armed forces. The three 
democracies are characterized by structural defects that are a result of the interac-
tions at the double intersection. While the traditional authoritarian systems were 
replaced, change was mostly restricted to form and did not include a change of 
attitudes or substance nor a solution of the structural problems that caused the 
wars. The – successful – transformation of the armed actors into political actors did 
not result in the establishment of viable reform alternatives beyond the political 
system. Democratization has helped to address one side of the region’s grievances 
but – at least up to the moment – it has failed to give a perspective for social 
change and inclusion (see Córdoba, Maihold and Kurtenbach 2001). 
 Whether the FMLN-based government (Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación 
Nacional) elected in 2009 in El Salvador will be able to make a difference remains 
to be seen. In Guatemala the former guerrilla is politically marginalized, and the 
political system is highly fragmented and organized along personal clientele net-
works. In Nicaragua the re-election of Daniel Ortega and the FSLN (Frente Sand-
inista de Liberación Nacional) has combined war-time political and traditional 
family-based power structures. Thus up to today, the development of the political 
system in all three societies resembles the structure and the relations of power 
shaped by war, violence and international interventions. 
Market economy 
The order of economic reproduction of a society has always been recognized as a 
prominent factor in the discussion of the causes and the resolution of wars. Histori-
cally the debate focused on the importance of inequality and maldevelopment as 
motivations for armed actors; whereas during the last decade the debate has shifted 
towards an analysis of the economies of war and greed as the main driving force of 
conflict. There was some discussion on the importance of globalization for war 
economies and their persistence because war economies – independent of the legal 
or illegal character of their products – could not be maintained or would be less 
significant without international markets and their demand. There is an increasing 
awareness that external interventions can influence peacebuilding negatively. Be-
sides globalization, liberalization of economies as promoted by the international 
financial institutions is an important factor reducing options at the societal level in 
post-war countries. While under a classical modernization perspective the introduc-
tion of market mechanisms is supposed to promote economic growth and thus de-
velopment, evidence for this is scarce even in non-war societies. In war-torn socie-
ties the effects of this approach have even been harmful, as some authors have 
shown early on for El Salvador.10 Neoliberal economic policies weaken the state’s 
capacities to offer employment in the formal sector, which they need for the inte-
gration of ex-combatants, migrants and displaced people. Privatization of state en-
terprises favours mostly traditional elites and actors who gained fortunes during 
and through violence. 
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 While awareness of the importance of economic developments and globaliza-
tion for armed conflicts and their dynamic has grown, the debate about the implica-
tions of these factors for peacebuilding is just beginning.11 Most peace accords do 
not address economic concerns directly but treat them ‘with little or vague discus-
sion’ (Woodward 2002, 184). Policy approaches to economic issues in post-war 
countries are mostly directed towards three goals: first, the replacement of illicit 
resources like drugs, or a change in their merchandizing (certification of diamonds, 
e.g.); second, the recovery of basic economic infrastructure as a basis for develop-
ment and growth (Boyce 2008); and third, the strengthening of the state’s capacity 
to obtain resources (Boyce and O’Donnell 2007). While all these factors are impor-
tant, they are highly related to the fact that war economies do not rest on income 
alone. They build political and social power structures through violence, intimida-
tion or clientelistic, patrimonial or personalistic mechanisms of domination and 
dependence. These structures limit overall peacebuilding efforts as well as eco-
nomic and political transformation. 
 In relation to economic transformation, external influences and the legacies of 
war economies are a central obstacle for development beyond macroeconomic 
growth. The key variable for sustainable peacebuilding is a development model 
promoting social inclusion and overcoming at least extreme forms of inequality. 
Even if the termination of war and violent conflict do not necessitate the immediate 
resolution of the underlying structural causes, the success or failure of liberal 
peacebuilding depends on the ability of the post-war society to address economic 
and developmental problems. So what are the main variables that need to be ana-
lysed under a societal perspective at the double intersection? 
o The modes of economic and social reproduction in relation to demands of the 
international market: a country’s economic structure, its dependence on re-
sources and/or labour, as well as its relations with the global and/or regional 
markets. The analysis of these issues helps to identify dependence and resil-
ience of overall economic development prospects. While the dependence on 
‘lootable’ resources seems to make violent conflict more likely, successful 
peacebuilding depends on the (re-)orientation of access to and use of material 
resources for the public good and welfare. This may not be guaranteed in a 
classical scheme to open the market.  
o War and violence influence the economic order in different ways, and have 
severe consequences for long-term development perspectives: changes in the 
distribution of and the access to economic resources are a result of displace-
ment and ethnic or political ‘cleansing’ leading up to long-term shifts in de-
mography (either rural-urban or across borders). The establishment of war 
economies provides a basis for the direct (territorial) control of resources and 
products serving as a financial basis for war. War economies do not automati-
cally disintegrate after the war’s end. 
Thus under a peacebuilding perspective, the central aim in post-war economies is 
not just reconstruction of the economic and social infrastructure, but a fundamental 
transformation of the access to and allocation of economic resources favouring at 
least a minimum of the public good and not just personal or group interests. This 
process is closely linked to existing power structures and the political regime. 
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Structural inequality in Central America 
Central America’s economic and social development is highly influenced by exter-
nal dynamics. During the 1980s and 1990s a process of transnationalization has 
been an economic as well as a demographic phenomenon favouring and reinforc-
ing existing structures of economic reproduction. The economic elites in the three 
countries were able to diversify their economic basis from the traditional agro-
export development model (coffee, bananas, sugar) by opening up to new agricul-
tural products (e.g. fruit and flowers) as well as to investment into the financial 
sector.12 Although the traditional oligarchies of the region were somewhat debili-
tated by war (and the Sandinista revolution in the case of Nicaragua), this did not 
weaken them substantially. Externally promoted privatization of state enterprises 
did not establish market-based mechanisms but created new monopolies partly 
based on criminal or violent networks. The differences between the three countries 
reflect the specific relations of power between status-quo-oriented and change-
oriented actors. In Nicaragua the revolution restricted the influence of the oligarchy 
and allowed for some upward mobility of new social forces around Sandinista net-
works. In El Salvador the oligarchic unity partly dissolved, but in Guatemala the 
power of the oligarchy remained largely untouched.13  
 Developments in Central America have rarely been analysed under a perspec-
tive of resource use and war economy because they were mostly perceived as re-
sults of the cold war. The wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua were externally 
funded; in the case of Nicaragua limitations set by the US-Congress on aid to the 
contras even led to the establishment of criminal networks to circumvent this.14 As 
Guatemala’s military regime did not receive foreign aid due to its gross human rights 
violations that not even the Reagan administration could ignore, the establishment of 
a war economy served as a substitute. The control of the country’s borders gave the 
military the control of different forms of smuggling (such as drugs and humans). 
These structures have not been dismantled or destroyed after the war ended. 
 War termination did lead to impressive growth rates and macroeconomic stabil-
ity in the whole region but not – or only marginally – to a decrease in social exclu-
sion and inequality.15 Traditional economic elites and international enterprises fa-
vour the modernization of the exclusionary model of development. Most invest-
ment in the region goes to so-called ‘megaproyectos’ in mining or energy offering 
only few jobs while profit is made by a small group of local or international entre-
preneurs paying minimal royalties and taxes. Thus natural resources are not used 
for the public good but for private enrichment, which is another process that can be 
interpreted as path dependency modernization instead of changing existing forms 
of exploitation and exclusion. 
 This process is reinforced by demographic transnationalization that was a result 
of war and violence leading to the displacement and migration of nearly two mil-
lion Central Americans inside and out of the region. At the same time the lack of 
social and economic mobility and the high levels of poverty constituted another 
push factor for mostly illegal migration to the United States (or Costa Rica in the 
case of Nicaragua). The so called remesas or remittances – money migrants send 
home to support their families – is the most important income in foreign exchange 
for the national accounts and has surpassed the traditional export earnings. While 
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this is an important basis for survival for the most marginalized groups in the three 
Central American countries, it also leads to a significant brain drain as the most edu-
cated and able people go north, thus weakening the human resources for sustainable 
development inside the region (see Orozco 2003, IAD 2004, Mahler 2000). 
 In short, there has been little or no transformation of the underlying develop-
ment patterns in Central America except for a modernization of deeply engrained 
inequality and exclusion. External influences and the consequences of war and 
violence have reinforced historic patterns while reform-oriented, internal actors 
remain weak. 
Pacification 
Under the perspective of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, democratization and 
development of market economies lead to positive feedbacks and pacification. An 
external intervention or support to end wars is a first important step in this direc-
tion. But what happens when peacekeeping missions or interim administrations 
leave the country? The lack of security is a fundamental problem in post-war con-
texts beyond the demobilizations of former combatants and the ‘civilization’ of 
their behaviour. Yet academic and policy debates as well as external interventions 
tend to focus on these war-related problems.16 Peace accords aim to end violence; 
the first step in this direction is a ceasefire followed by the demobilization and re-
integration of former combatants. International actors focus on promoting demobi-
lization and demilitarization of combatants. The key variable for transformation is 
the establishment of democratically controlled forms of violence control. The in-
ternal societal basis for non-violent forms of conflict regulation, however, is either 
very fragile or non-existing in most post-war countries. While the necessity for rule 
of law provisions is obvious, another question is whether these forms have to com-
ply with so-called international (or western) standards or if indigenous forms of 
customary law might be more suitable. 
 Violence after war is neither identical with the violence in war nor does it al-
ways occur in the same geographical areas.17 It takes place in a grey area where 
different forms of violence coalesce while mechanisms to provide security are 
fragile or do not exist. The establishment of at least rudimentary forms of public 
security thus hinges on more than just the reform or reestablishment of the state’s 
security forces. Thus, it is important not only to look at the continuity between 
war-related and post-war violence, but at the same time to identify the specifics 
and the new elements of this violence, its actors and functions. Under the societal 
perspective of the double intersection we can identify different influences on vio-
lence and pacification or violence control: 
o Societies develop certain forms of control, handling, acceptance or legitimiza-
tion of violent behaviour that are highly influenced by the existing symbolical 
order (religion, belief systems etc.). These features will change over time but 
are rather path-dependent.18 
o Consequences of war and widespread violence on post-war pacification are 
twofold. First, even in war, violence is not just instrumental for the ‘master 
cleavage’ (that is the conflict patterns at the macro level) but resembles a mix-
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ture of privatized, economic and political forms of violence at the micro level 
(Kalyvas 2006). Hence, many forms of violence do not automatically end with 
a ceasefire and the end of war. Second, there is a line of research arguing that 
violence reproduces itself. Writing on Colombia, Waldmann (2002, 2001ff) de-
scribed this as a process of everyday violence institutionalization, and others 
have labelled this process the establishment of ‘cultures of violence’ 
(Rupesinghe 1994). 
Under the perspective of the double intersection, pacification or violence control 
will depend less on external interventions and more on existing relations of power. 
Traditional forms of violence control – e.g., the legitimization or de-legitimization 
by existing symbolical or religious orders – are one important factor. The persist-
ing influence and societal control by violent actors either of important economic 
resources or state institutions is another factor. 
Post-war violence in Central America 
In Central America the initiatives to restructure public security met a history and 
culture where the security forces were the central pillar of a repressive state and 
where war and violence reinforced the traditional role of the military. Different 
interactions and features of these processes explain the varying degrees of success 
and failure in the Central American countries. External actors supported the demo-
bilization of the ex-combatants and the reduction of the armed forces. This was the 
most successful part in the implementation of the Central American peace accords 
although experiences differ: in the case of Nicaragua it took President Violeta 
Chamorro over 40 accords to satisfy the – overwhelmingly economic – demands of 
rearmed contras and compas (demobilized soldiers of the army). In the second half 
of the 1990s, the remaining ex-combatants were reduced to rural banditry acting 
mostly in the northern regions of the country. In El Salvador the most serious inci-
dent was the detection of arms the FMLN had kept hidden in Nicaragua. But the 
UN mission was able to solve this problem rapidly enough so that it did not lead to 
a rupture of the whole process. In Guatemala demobilizations of the former guer-
rilla members was completed by 1998. These variations reflect the differences in 
the structure and power relations showing influences of the experience of war as 
well as specific outcomes of the overall transformation. While the Salvadoran 
guerrilla was a homogenous and structured organization with a shared ideology, 
the contras in Nicaragua were a wild mixture of groups opposing the Sandinista 
government for very different reasons and were held together mostly by financial 
support and pressure from the US. The Guatemalan guerrilla was the weakest of 
the insurgent forces as it lacked a substantial number of combatants as well as ex-
ternal support.19 
 Concerning the reduction of the military, differences reflecting variations in the 
degree of the military’s historical and war-related autonomy from the government 
are even more pronounced. Central Americas’ armed forces traditionally have been 
the central pillar of the state as – side by side with the Catholic Church – they used 
to be the only national institution with a presence in most of the territory and con-
trol of the rural areas. Only in the case of Nicaragua was the traditional repressive 
state apparatus destroyed by the Sandinista revolution and substituted by a totally 
104  |  Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe 88, abril de 2010 
 
new force of former FSLN combatants. After the FSLN lost the elections in 1990, 
professionalization and depolitization were the central mechanisms for the institu-
tional survival of the armed forces. If they had tried to take sides in the political 
struggle between the Sandinistas and the new government, they most probably 
would have faced abolishment following the examples of Costa Rica and Panama. 
In El Salvador the war led to a process of militarization of the society under a civil-
ian-military coalition, but the military stayed dependent on foreign support (mostly 
US) as well as subordinated to the traditional oligarchy which was organized in the 
right wing ARENA party (Alianza Republicana Nacional). In contrast the Guate-
malan military not only had sole control of the state until 1985, it also retained its 
independence and autonomy from the oligarchy even after the democratic opening. 
In 1986, the first elected president, Vinicio Cerezo, admitted that he had not more 
than 30 per cent of the power – a feature that did not change till the end of the war 
in 1996. Only the government of Oscar Berger (2004-2008) was able implement a 
substantial reduction of the military. 
 While demobilization was quite successful, reintegration of former ex-
combatants faced serious limits. Due to the lack of job opportunities in the formal 
economy, many former combatants joined either delinquent groups or private secu-
rity companies. The lack of control over a diversity of armed actors is one of the 
central problems of public (in-)security in the region. It is a combined result of the 
deficits of the peace processes and the lack of opportunities in the formal economy 
(see Pérez Saínz 2000). Demobilization should have included the paramilitary 
forces in all three countries, too. But although they were declared illegal or the 
decrees establishing them were revoked, they were not disarmed. In all three coun-
tries this deficit is reflected in the extremely high numbers of small arms in the 
hands of society. A recent UNODC study (2007, 16) cites reputable sources from 
the region, which assume that there are about 500,000 fire arms that are legally 
registered and 800,000 that remain unregistered. The high level of violent crime all 
over the region is another legacy of the wars.20 But there are some differences as 
well. Although the paramilitary structures of the war did not survive in El Salvador 
or Nicaragua, in the case of Guatemala they have persisted and are still a factor of 
repression, political pressure and, in some regions, social control (see Peacock and 
Beltrán 2003; Kurtenbach 2006). 
 Within this context three interrelated issues dominate the public security 
agenda: organized crime (drug trafficking, and other illicit activities), delinquency 
and youth gangs. The high levels of poverty and exclusion as well as the everyday 
experience of violence explain the high levels of delinquency and youth gangs. The 
fact that the dimensions of these problems are lower in Nicaragua than in the other 
two countries may also be a result of the different character of the Nicaraguan po-
lice, which (at least compared to the other countries) is more professional, empha-
sizes prevention and follows a community-oriented approach (see Rocha 2005, 
Bautista Lara 2006). 
 As to organized crime, there are differences, too. Only in Guatemala has organ-
ized crime permeated the structures of the state as well as the political system. This 
is a result of two processes that are related to the historical fragmentation of Gua-
temala’s society and to the lack of control of the civilian forces over the armed 
forces and their allies (Kurtenbach 2008). The reduction of the armed forces has 
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not led to their disempowerment as an organized actor as it has in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua; instead it has served to heighten their autonomy and has led to the for-
mation of criminal networks (the so-called parallel or obscure powers). Allegations 
that youth gangs are involved in drug trafficking can neither be substantiated nor 
proven, nor are they responsible for the high homicide rates in the region. UNODC 
(2007, 16ff) cites a study of the Salvadoran Forensic Institute and a Guatemalan 
police study that hold youth gangs responsible for 8 per cent and 14 per cent of 
homicides respectively. This contradicts the common discourse of the Central 
American media and politicians. 
 In summary, we can state that the establishment of a legitimate and democrati-
cally controlled public security sector as a central condition for pacification was 
most successful in Nicaragua and shows serious deficits in the case of El Salvador 
and even more so in Guatemala. This can be explained due to the impact that, first 
of all, the Nicaraguan revolution and, secondly, the election of the opposition had 
on the public security apparatus. At the same time exclusion and poverty all over 
the region remained the main structural causes at work responsible for the increase 
of violence and crime The response to these problems shows a high level of conti-
nuity, too, as the social practices of selective political violence and repression still 
exist, although at a lower level than before and during the war. Nevertheless this 
leads to a self-enforcing cycle of repression, rising crime and exclusion.  
Peacebuilding beyond Central America 
The comparison of the Central American case studies under the perspective of the 
double intersection shows that path dependency seems to be strongest in relation to 
the political system and to the development model. Changes have been mostly su-
perficial and due to international pressure (for democratization and elections as 
well as for market liberalization) and globalization. This has led to a mere mod-
ernization of the traditional status quo where the majority of the population is mar-
ginalized and excluded, while a few are able to accumulate wealth. Thus the struc-
tural causes of violence have remained while the expressions of violence have 
changed.  
 Developments in the Central American post-war societies do not provide proof 
for the self-enforcing positive cycle of liberal peacebuilding, but rather appear to 
show elements of a negative cycle. The lack of social inclusion produces high lev-
els of informality and crime. This has negative consequences for the necessary 
social foundation as well as for the legitimacy of the political systems. In this con-
text spoilers or adversaries to reform are able to use corruption and (mostly selec-
tive) violence to impede fundamental changes. This limits the capacity of reform-
oriented actors (inside and outside of the state) to establish inclusive forms of de-
velopment and government. 
 As Central America was one of the first laboratories for liberal peacebuilding, 
the question remains what can be learned at a more general level for the analysis of 
the problems of post-war societies as well as for the work of internal and external 
actors ‘on the ground’. First of all, fundamental changes in path dependent devel-
opments are only possible if these changes have an indigenous basis inside society. 
Otherwise external interventions might strengthen internal actors in favour of 
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transformation without the possibility of overcoming structural or historical block-
ades. Elections are a case in point. Without a reform-oriented basis they will only 
lead to a formal legitimization of the existing status quo. A strategy of empower-
ment of and alignment with reform-oriented actors or ‘drivers of change’ can only 
be successful in the medium or long term. Short term strategies – favoured by most 
external actors looking for exit options and needing to adjust their resources to 
global necessities or political priorities – are rarely sustainable and are endangered 
by spoiler action. Hence peacebuilding strategies need to be aware of the fact that 
peacebuilding is an intermestic issue that can only partly be influenced by external 
actors. Secondly, stabilization and transformation of post-war societies and post-
war states are important. But unlike some critics of the liberal peacebuilding para-
digm suggest, stabilization does not need to rely mostly on the repressive capacity 
of the state (police, military), but should be based on inclusion and participation. 
Otherwise, stabilization might either be a short interlude or lead to renewed con-
flict and violence. At the same time, the credibility of international conventions 
and institutions is dependent on the universality of fundamental human rights. Opt-
ing for a peacebuilding sequence of ‘stabilization first, democratization later’ is not 
viable in the global context of the twenty-first century. It would be a relapse to 
colonial paternalism where the ‘developed’ countries of the North decide which 
post-war countries are ripe for democracy. This should not be a serious alternative. 
Thirdly, peacebuilding is just one set of the policies that influence the develop-
ments in post-war countries. The impact of economic or financial globalization 
usually outweighs the possibilities of peacebuilding programmes by far. Thus ex-
ternal and internal actors have to set out priorities as well as integrated peacebuild-
ing approaches. The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission is a first small step 
in this direction. 
 More research is necessary to enhance and systematize knowledge on the inter-
sections relevant for peacebuilding by linking it to social change and broader proc-
esses of transformation. This is no easy task. But as Philipp Schmitter (2009:59) 
states: ‘Comparativists – whether of ruly or unruly politics – should be equipping 
themselves to conceptualize, measure and understand the great increase of com-
plexity of the relations of power, influence, and authority in the world that sur-
rounds them’.  
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1. For the peace processes at the regional and the national levels see Arnson (1999), Child (1992), 
Dunkerley (1994), Isacson (1997), Rouquié (1992) among others. 
2. During the last two decades, external actors have broadened their scope of activities due to the 
multitude of challenges and problems. In the beginning the main focus was to prevent a relapse into 
war or armed conflict as expressed in the Agenda for Peace of UN Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali in 1992 (p. 11). This concept was extended in a supplement in 1995, through the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG), the task force report ‘Our Shared Responsibilities’ (UN 
2004) and the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. 
3. Most of all, the theories on civilization and modernization by Max Weber, Joseph Schumpeter and 
Norbert Elias, among others. 
4. Paris 2004 is an exception. On the problems in post-war societies see Pugh (2000) and Licklider 
(2001); on international peace-operations Doyle and Sambanis (2006); on war termination Stead-
man, Rothchild, and Cousens (2002), Walter (2002); on development Junne and Verkoren (2005). 
5. See Pierson (2004) and Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003) among others. 
6. Criticism is directed at the euro-centric bias of this approach and doubts that the European ‘Son-
derweg’ could or should be generalised, and serves as a reference point for other world regions 
namely the countries of the global south (e.g. Richmond 2005). Others argue that even in demo-
cratic regimes violence is not overcome but that democracy allows for the mobilization along ethnic 
lines which has led to the severest acts of collective violence during the twentieth century such as 
the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide (see Mann 2005). 
7. On elections in post-war societies see Kumar (1998). For a more comprehensive focus see Barnes 
(2001), Call and Cook (2003), Call (2007), Burnell (2007), Jarstad and Sisk (2008); on the relation-
ship between democratization and peacebuilding De Zeeuw (2005), De Zeeuw and Kumar (2006). 
8. In many post-war contexts institutionalized power sharing is established in peace accords (see 
Bastian and Luckham 2003). But while this may serve as a mechanism of short-term stabilization, it 
may lead to the systematic exclusion of other actors. This can cause renewed conflict and violence 
as can historically be observed in Colombia’s National Front experience as well as recently in 
Lebanon. 
9. El Salvador and Guatemala experienced phases of political opening that ended in repression and 
violence (1932 and 1944-1954); in Nicaragua various US interventions undermined indigenous 
processes and ended in the installation of the Somoza dictatorship (see Dunkerley 1988). 
10. See de Soto and del Castillo (1994) and Boyce et al. (1995), for a more general argument in the 
same direction Kamphuis (2004). 
11. On the economy of wars, war-economies and peacebuilding see Keen (1998, 2000), Jean and Rufin 
(1999), Berdal and Malone (2000), Collier et al. (2003), Ballentine and Nitschke (2005); on eco-
nomic consequences of war see Lake (1990), Stewart and Valpy (2001), Collier (2001). 
12. A first wave of fundamental change began during 1950s and 1960s when these exportable com-
modities displaced subsistence economy, education levels increased and state institutions reached 
rural areas (see Williams 1994). On transnationalization see Robinson (2003); for changes in the 
agrarian sector see Paige (1998) and Vilas (1995). 
13. On related data see UNDP (2006), CEPAL (2005), Sojo (1999), Vilas (1999), PNUD (2003). 
14. The illegal supply of the Contra with weapons was financed with the trading of drugs and weapons 
leading to the so-called Iran-Contra scandal when it became public (see Scott and Marshall 1991). 
15. For development in Central America see PNUD (2003) and Robinson (2003). 
16. On different „markets of security in post-war societies see Lambach (2008); on transformation 
processes and security sector reform see Cawthra and Luckham (2003); on post-war contexts Holm 
and Espen (2000), Call and Cook (2003), Call (2007), Muggah (2009). 
17. On the discussion of violence and peace processes and post-war violence see Darby (2001, 2006); 
on the security gap for ex-combatants Walter (1999, 2002). 
18. The United States and its discourse on the right of self-defence is an interesting example as this can 
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be backtracked to the early years of settlement and the frontier mentality. Even today initiatives to 
restrict the availability of guns are knocked down with this argument. In Latin America an interest-
ing example is the change in Catholicism when liberation theology was interpreted as a legitimiza-
tion for changing the existing social order by force. See Levine (1986) and Löwy (1996). 
19. For a discussion on civil-military relations and demobilization see Isacson (1997), Brenes and 
Casas (1998); for Guatemala see Schirmer (1998, 2002) and Keen (2003); for El Salvador Stanley 
(1994); for Nicaragua Horton (1998), Lincoln and Sereseres (2000). 
20. On post-war violence in Central America see Call (2000), Moser and Winton (2002), UNODC 
(2007), PNUD (2009). 
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